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A commentary on
A crisis in comparative psychology: where have all the undergraduates gone?
by Abramson, C. I. (2015). Front. Psychol. 6:1500. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01500
Abramson recently expressed concern over the fact that the comparative psychology discipline
might be in danger, as the number of academic courses bearing its name is low (Abramson, 2015). In
contrast to Abramson we do not think that a fading name equals a dying science. On the contrary,
it is likely a sign of a developing science and a more multifaceted education.
That a discipline’s name does not contain “comparative” does not mean that comparisons are
not made, or are crucial. If subscribing to the definition given by Abramson: “similarities and
differences in the behavior of organisms,” it is in fact difficult to imagine an animal science without
any comparisons. For example, ethology is a branch of science with inherently comparative studies
of animal behavior (Burkhardt, 2005). There is no obvious monopoly on comparative methods in
comparative psychology. The approach of comparing organisms is a biological one, stemming from
pre-Darwinian times in such fields as comparative anatomy.
Comparisons with humans, especially, are ubiquitous in many disciplines. That such disciplines
would not offer training in making valid comparisons—whatever that is—appears to be an
unfounded assumption.We hope that animal sciences, along withmost other sciences, also develop
the students’ “critical thinking skills, personal exploration, cultivating a comprehensive view of the
world around them, and their ability to apply their skills in both academic and applied fields” just
as well as comparative psychology does. Students can certainly learn about “analogies, homologies,
subject variables, environmental variables, observation skills, etc.” in a course on e.g., animal
cognition, or behavioral ecology.
The crux of the matter seems to be that Abramson lacks a place for the comparative study of
behavior without reference to cognition. Still, he wants to call this psychology, and demand a place
for this in introductory texts and courses on psychology. It is true that “cognition” or “cognitive” are
moot and debatable terms, but so is “behavior” (Levitis et al., 2009). Cognition is a contemporary
term that for us encompasses a host of phenomena concerning behaviors in organisms with a
nervous system. Contrary to the author we believe that cognition is a broad concept, and involves
fundamental processes.
Abramson posits that comparative cognition is based on a very specific theoretical position,
including the belief that internal cognitive processes can be studied scientifically. First of all,
cognitive science(s) is far from a specific theoretical position, there are numerous contradicting
hypotheses. Secondly, the belief that cognition can be measured through behavior is as much a
belief as the notion that evolution can by measured through observations, or that learning might
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be studied without assuming memory, and retrieval mechanisms.
Thirdly, viewing cognition as purely “internal” is an antiquated
position; contemporary cognitive theories often view cognition
as a causal process where the body’s interaction with the
environment is essential, or is part of the cognitive process
(Gärdenfors, 2008).
Abramson seems to think that such things as physiology
and evolution are beyond the scope of comparative cognition—
we cannot see this. He also appears to mean that behaviorist
questions cannot be studied within a cognitive framework. If
this refers to learning theories, then such an assumption is false.
Learning theories are in our experience given plenty of room in
courses on e.g., animal cognition.
We would share Abramsons’ concerns of a disappearing
body of knowledge if we thought it was true. Instead, we
think that the successful methods and theories of such various
fields as e.g., comparative psychology, ethology, neurocognition,
developmental psychology, philosophy, and theoretical biology,
are today incorporated in the education in animal cognition,
as well as in other courses with different names. The study
of animals’ behaviors and minds has always been an eclectic
enterprise.
Fractionalisation is a natural result of both the dynamics of
science and the branding necessary to explain a field’s content.
We regret to learn that Abramson sees a need for faculties to point
out the value of comparative psychology. But is this best done by
distancing the subject from sister subjects? This is arguably not
a fruitful way to establish the image of an important discipline.
Integration is the proof that something is of use for something
else.
Comparative psychology has been a discipline mainly of
North American concern, and Abramson’s paper is heavy
with references to American conditions. In Europe there has
traditionally been a focus on the biological disciplines, such as
ethology (Burkhardt, 2005). One should not be surprised in
not finding many programs and courses named “comparative
psychology” when browsing European universities. In Sweden we
call the subject “cognitive zoology,” and for pedagogical reasons
we call our courses “animal cognition.” In Austria it is called
“cognitive biology.” In UK one would find various names and
so on. However, the curriculums of the different programs and
courses overlap. Perhaps this is the case in USA too? It could of
course be that the implicit definition of “comparative cognition”
differs between USA and Europe, which might give Abramson
right with respect to “comparative cognition” being a heavily
reduced form of “comparative psychology.” In that case the
cognitively inclined researchers in Europe should be worried
too, as Abramson’s observations would then indeed indicate a
narrowing of the theoretical scope in USA. In order to judge
whether this is the case, a more qualitative analysis is required.
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